Monday, October 13, 2014

Cole and Dayna and the new excuse to visit my adoptive home town

Lately, I’ve not been entirely certain when I might go back to Facebook. That trepidation has had a lot to do with the kind of posting I’ve seen today with regard to the imminent relocation of my friends Cole and Dayna Reed to Portland, OR in order to ensure more solid parental rights with regard to their coming child. 

I had a short text exchange with Cole today regarding when the three of us would next meet for dinner (usually Costco pizza & martinis at my place). The gist was that the response to the press release for their upcoming move was far less than ideal, though they’ve received much support from their friends. Given what I’ve read on the 12 News Facebook page (here and, more particularly, here), I see her point and feel for both of them.

This is a rare moment of conciseness for me (though you may disagree) and I’ll preface what I intend to say next with this: I’m a middle-aged, professional, disabled, bisexual male. My most committed relationships have been heterosexual in nature, but the fact of my bisexuality has never changed. Of course, I’m saying nothing here that Cole and Dayna don’t already know. However, I’ve had (and taken advantage of) the dubious advantage of appearing largely straight through nearly all of my adult life – even to many of those closest to me – and have never felt I’ve had a good reason to lead anyone to believe that I’m anything other than absolutely straight. Some of the responses to Cole and Dayna today illustrate why this is an advantage. That changes now for the sake of the solidarity that I have to acknowledge with my friends. Anything that any of you who have ever debated with me on the issue of gay marriage or reparative therapies can adjust your opinions and dispositions toward me accordingly. No doubt many of my more conservative friends will be re-evaluating those conversations. However, nothing I’ve ever said on these matters has ever been meant to benefit me personally. This must appear particularly obvious, as I’ve never played the “special” card that Cole and Dayna are accused of playing. I’ve said it because it is right and it’s time that I share the risk with them.

So, as some of you have asked, “Why is this news?” First of all, it’s news because you make it news. If this were any other coupled set of small business owners, you wouldn’t be asking that question. You wouldn’t be going to the trouble of posting to Facebook on something that you likely only tripped over while flipping channels. You’ve asked it only because they are gay and, therefore, perpetuate this as some twisted version of the news yourselves. All you see is “gay,” and your very attention on the matter draws contention in the same way that a book burning compels us to read what is being burned. If you don’t think this is news, why are you wasting your time and making it news?

For the “straight white males” out there who have pointed themselves out as the non-recipients of certain rights and respect… get over yourselves. You’ll have notice that Cole and Dayna are leaving and not asking you for anything and the respect that they have has been earned, not simply afforded them because they are gay. Certainly, you weren’t asked to tell us how NOT special you are. Cole and Dayna are not flamboyant (though you might be more comfortable if they were less visible) and Cole has made it quite plain that she does not intend to be a victim in this. Telling their friends and patrons that they are leaving is a loving act of consideration and just good business, not an attempt to compare themselves to you. Indeed, they are two of the most frustratingly self-reliant people I’ve ever known and I wish that I had more opportunities to help them. They’re not asking you for a thing and this isn’t some zero-sum game where attention lavished on them means attention and respect taken from you.

Just a couple of hours before her TED talk late last year, Cole caught me sipping tea crammed into a corner at Songbird Coffee & Tea House. We’d talked much longer than Cole had intended, but it’s usually hard for us to tear ourselves away. Cole and I agreed on something rather important that morning. As a blind man, I’ve not been spared my share of contusions, cuts and broken noses that have often been the result of a desperate wish to appear normal (and thereby avoid using my cane for far too long) and be all but pathologically independent. More straightforwardly, I’ve needed simply to move – to travel and continue to connect outside my home – and that often much faster than is prudent. Though sometimes rooted in a less noble desire, the risk is productive, if not always sensible. I’m likely one of the most beautifully well-adapted and adjusted blind men you will ever meet. You probably  won’t realize I’m blind when we meet… but I have been hurt, and that sometimes badly. But I’ve never risked as Cole, Dayna and many of my less closeted counterparts have.

What Cole and I agreed on is that we have to be willing to risk harm to continue to gain ground – or sometimes simply keep what we have. This is distinct from wanting to be hurt. Keeping our heads and not twisting ourselves into masochistically driven, self-deceived messes is the trick. Keeping… and letting go of… ourselves is the trick. Knowing that there will be a blow coming and not finding ourselves flinching every time our phones vibrate is the trick. I will do a Dick Van Dyke over the ottoman again eventually (For those of you that this reference dates, click here.). Cole and Dayna will meet the ever-resentful “not specials” and “why is this news?” people again. They will be met with less passive-aggressive, more self-righteous and open hostility.

The trick is to know we’re loved, even if we don’t feel so special. The trick is to remember that we’ve loved. That may be the most important bit. As a more supportive Facebook poster noted in a comment on the following photo, “… I think you can be about ‘being right’ or you can choose love. Love is always the best choice.”



While we may not be losing them as friends, we are losing the opportunity to brush past Cole and Dayna from time to time and feel their specialness – and how special we feel around them. I’m genuinely grateful for that. Thank you. I love you both.

Thursday, July 31, 2014

Commentary: “Unbelievable: A French atheist-turned-theologian discusses his conversion” Part 1: On the account itself

(This commentary will roughly follow the course of the show that Guillaume Bignon and I were invited to have a conversation on by Justin Brierley.)

In June of this year while planning a trip to London with a friend I’d taken it in my head to contact Justin Brierley, a broadcaster with Premier Christian Radio and host of the popular broadcast and podcast, Unbelievable? In order that we might get together and simply say “hello.” I’d written to Justin on just a few occasions with regard to a variety of philosophical and apologetic topics and he’d always treated my comments with interest and fairness. In short, he seemed like a nice guy that I might like to get to know a little better.

The day after setting up what I assumed would be a short meeting, Justin emailed me and asked if I might like to be on the show discussing conversion with French theologian, Guillaume Bignon. Of course, I agreed.

Justin and I had some time to chat both in the outer office and in the small studio we would eventually contact Guillaume via Skype and record in. Justin is a lovely man and I’d happily follow his masterful lead again if given the opportunity. He did a marvelous job of smoothly channeling my innate “thoroughness” (Put less flatteringly, my tendency to explain to death each point I’m asked to address.). In more contentious or adversarial conversation, this tendency has been referred to by friends as “Wade’s death by a thousand nuances.” I can tend to talk a lot. It would seem that I’m still talking…

After spending some time setting up, we eventually had Guillaume on the line and had an additional opportunity to chat. Guillaume is a very earnest man and I was impressed with what seemed his sincere desire to connect his personal experience to a broader truth. That will be the subject of this blog post. So, I think that I’ll start with simply running down Guillaume’s account of his conversion in brief. Please note, this is meant to simply start as an outline, not a comprehensive examination of Guillaume’s conversion – that comes later; so keep reading…

  • Guillaume grew up “nominally Roman Catholic” and went to Mass on a regular basis.
  • Guillaume suggests that atheism may be – more or less – a kind of cultural norm in France… with religion, perhaps, to be taken more as “superstition” than true religiosity.
  • He notes that he “went through the motions for years” and at a time (I assume seeing this in retrospect) he came to a point in his life in which he could cross a tipping point and, as he told his parents, “I don’t believe any of this” and stopped going to Mass. Guillaume notes that, “My life as an atheist was really not different at all than it had been before. It’s just that there had been no pretense anymore and I was essentially pursuing my own pleasure and happiness in life so, I, on various grounds… because of that favorable environment at home and my mom’s devotion to our education, I did very well in school…” Guillaume went on to study in mathematics and the hard sciences. He additionally exercised what is now starting to sound like a prodigious personal drive by joining a band and national league volleyball.
  • At a comment from Justin, Guillaume notes that he was “pursuing that happiness pretty ferociously.” He goes on to note the pursuit of “French atheistic ideals” in the form of “feminine conquest.” This bears examination later as to whether this is merely an atheistic ideal or something more deeply adjoined to his conversion. One begins to receive the idea from Guillaume that what he is calling atheism is another way of saying “hedonism.” This will not be the first time that he will have suggested a particular self-serving “atheistic ideal.”
  • As Justin notes, part of Guillaume’s journey lay in continuing to pursue female interests. This would be the point at which Guillaume begins to look into Christianity more systematically – at least in as much as creating an evidential framework is concerned. This is also the point that Guillaume begins to make oblique references to the improbability of what follows.
  • A brief follow-up point to Guillaume’s comment: ““My life as an atheist was really not different at all than it had been before. It’s just that there had been no pretense anymore and I was essentially pursuing my own pleasure and happiness in life…”

In quasi-biblical fashion, we could surmise that this might be so because Guillaume was never really an atheist. I’m going to surmise that it’s possible that Guillaume never maturely considered atheism. It’s worth setting on a peg the idea that he was pursuing “my own fame and pleasure” and perhaps taking a look later at whether or not that is essentially different now.

As was summed up in the show, here is my perspective on the upshot:
Guillaume’s going “through the motions for years” is a very familiar story. That he saw little to no difference in his “life as an atheist” before and after is indicative of what many of us go through as children. However, the way Guillaume seems to frame the issue might be paraphrased as, “In much of the time that I spent growing up as a Roman Catholic, I was an atheist. One day, I was simply ‘old enough’ to make this declaration to my parents.” Guillaume did not give an account of his parents’ reactions and one is given the impression of a conscientious, rather well-educated French couple shrugging in unison – except that there was something suggested simply in the need to tell them that he was an atheist that implies that their belief (if not their Catholicism) was something other than nominal. My guess would be that by “old enough” (about four minutes into the show) Guillaume was specifying around the time of puberty.

Though Guillaume reports that he was an atheist, it is not at all clear that he was an atheist in the sense that many of us – as atheists – tend to understand the term now. This would include the often jarring disconnection that we experience as a result of our exposure to a disapproving Christian community. Indeed, it can even be said that younger atheists don’t understand their own dispositions as atheists particularly well – hence the extremely frequent references to theistic hypocrisy, “your God,” and the apparent conflation of the hypothetical with the real. Can most adolescents be reasonably expected to bear very deep insight into such things? In most cases, I’d say the answer to that question is “No.”

On the surface, Guillaume gives every appearance of having pursued a woman that he was attracted to toward, if not into, Christianity. I didn’t get the impression that this was a shared endeavor in which she guided his exploration. In fact, she starts to take on an almost incidental aspect – at least in the context of the show.

But with regard to the probabilistic aspect of his conversion that the woman played no small part in…

“I was in this very secular culture. The chances of me ever hearing the Gospel, let alone believing it, were extremely slim and it happened in a funny way…”

Given time and experience, many of us of a “certain age” would say that speculating on the slimness of chances in most circumstances would be unwise – particularly with regard to something as fundamental as how we see the world. Many of us would say, “Be surprised and delighted when you can be, but expect anything and everything.” Guillaume goes on to describe in probabilistic terms what I’ve heard referred to as “the implausible.” His language takes on a tone and content highly suggestive of this (i.e., “We decided out of the blue, one day…,” as though spontaneity on holiday at St. Martin were highly suspect). In this sense, doing something one time and only one time is indicative of a “random” occurrence as opposed to an infrequent intention. Life is simply happening to Guillaume now and he is no longer pursuing; rather like when someone falls in love. Perception of life shifts from intentional to serendipitous and everything just “falls together,” so to speak. We will most often project this perception backward into the past as well as forward with regard to our expectations. Human beings are notoriously unreliable at sifting context (particularly emotional) out of what we think we are recollecting objectively and, thereby, “prime” our own memories in some very particular ways. (There is no doubt in my mind that the impression that has filtered down from out of an “information processing model of cognition” and the nearly continuous comparison of the brain to a computer bears much of the blame for a misplaced confidence in our own memories.) I won’t go into the deeper descriptions of the circumstances that Guillaume finds improbable (on an island with an area of 87 square kilometers – 53 square kilometers of which are sovereign French territory and visited by millions of tourists each year). For these purposes, we might assume that for reasons not made entirely clear on the show, Guillaume began to think and feel in a way that was fundamentally different to what he’d been accustomed to – at least as he remembers it.

Having been raised in part Roman Catholic myself, what I’d found highly improbable was that Guillaume was unaware of what Christianity “claims” (hence, his ongoing deeper study). What I find more probable is that one would set out on a confirmatory course in order to – as has already been noted – pursue one’s pleasure. As crass as that sounds, I don’t want to undersell Guillaume’s intentions. If I’m speculating correctly, while he and others may not see the intention and direction that I describe as ennobling, it is normal and quite human. This, in and of itself, makes it special.

Born of religious consideration or not, one of the important things that comes out of this is Guillaume’s examination of what – in his terms – was simply taken for granted culturally. This simple exercise in and of itself is worthwhile and if it places Guillaume in the world as a Christian his Christianity may, as previously noted, be perfectly reasonable, if not representative of an objective actuality. (And when I say, “objective” I mean a constrained objectivity – one taken from the only perspective we actually have – subjective and intersubjective – as true objectivity, like conceptions of infinity, nothingness, God and even other peoples’ minds are hypothetical constructs. This does not mean that any one or all are objectively false, simply that there is no one referent and that none can be contained in any single description. They also all share the characteristic of not being directly observable, but must be inferred.)

Christian rationalists will complain with a question: “How then can we know anything?” The short response – whether you are a Christian or not – is that you operate in the world as though you do, no matter how you choose to describe the term “know.” This makes the question academic and, from a practical point of view, often not even worth considering. Where I find it most stridently and deeply considered is in the form of a rhetorical justification of faith. Indeed, as Guillaume goes on to describe his burgeoning relationship with Jesus – if not the woman he was pursuing (she seems to become more or less incidental; this may be a deliberate omission as she may have been part of the very serious transgression that Guillaume described to various levels here, in his own written account of conversion and the one that he gave to CBN verbally.) – as underscored by how impressed he was with Jesus’ rhetorical competence and authority (or at least the accounts given by Paul and the Gospel writers).

There are, of course, more accounts of serendipity – now described in terms of constraints that conspired against Guillaume’s investigation (i.e., restrictions on his time that prevented him from going to a church “even if I wanted to”). Suffice it to say, Guillaume happened to find the time to visit a church. In the context of a petitionary prayer made for revelation, Guillaume noted that what “couldn’t happen” (going to a church) did, in fact happen. (Again, note the “happen” here, as opposed to the intentional, I  “wanted” or “didn’t want” to visit a church, observe a congregation “in action,” so to speak, and speak seriously to a vicar with regard to belief. Guillaume was no longer describing his life in terms of intention, he was describing it in terms of constraint and serendipity, setting up the “improbable” to “impossible;” in essence, setting up a miracle of belief.

This brings us to another usage of the term “[completely] out of the blue” [emphasis mine]; the failure of Guillaume’s shoulder and his being sidelined. It is largely unnecessary to go into great statistical detail here. I’ll simply link to one of many indications of the utter commonness of shoulder injury in higher level volleyball players (I’ll additionally speculate that the injured shoulder was the one connected to his spiking arm.):


Life happens to Guillaume. A young man begins to discover that what he intends is inadequate to explain or direct the course of his life. We may quibble over the details of the article and how they apply specifically to Guillaume. However, given the description that he applies to his life, thus far, “attacker” is likely an appropriate term here.

It takes almost no effort at all for someone un-invested in a broader meaning (and I’m not suggesting that there isn’t one with regard to Guillaume’s life) to place his injury, his love, his passion, etc. in a context that does not indicate anything more special than what any of us experience.

Of course, Guillaume’s injury afforded him the opportunity to visit a church in Paris. His account, for all intents and purposes, describes a stressful, embarrassing, furtive enterprise. It is worth noting at this point that being taken out of a life – even if only temporarily – is occasion for a deeper, perhaps religious, examination of our lives. I see this in no way as mysteriously coincidental.

Guillaume goes on to describe his “escape” from this church following the sermon – avoiding “eye contact… with any of these weirdoes” in order to not be pressed into conversation. He describes “jumping” to his feet and “running” to the door in order to make good this escape. On the threshold, Guillaume describes a “strong blast of chills that I got in my stomach and all the way in my chest and grabbing me by the throat and stopping me on the doorstep…” Interestingly, Guillaume does not describe the resolution of these symptoms upon returning to the church and introducing himself to the pastor.

“I don’t remember a thing the preacher said that day, but I was very, very uncomfortable.”

Guillaume had an anxiety attack. (There may be a very good neuro-cognitive reason that Guillaume either failed to encode or is failing to recall the memory of that day’s sermon as he relates this story.)

When I was doing agency work and in private practice I dealt with many people in many contexts who experienced these symptoms. One of the ways that I would help my (very familiar and better established) clients was to literally induce anxiety attacks. The onset, progression and resolution of such attacks are very well-studied phenomenon with neurological correlates. Inducing such attacks helps clients obtain a more objective perspective on them and realize the malleability of the experience of suffering and how it might be sorted out from more strictly recognizable physical symptoms (i.e., the very common impression during panic attack that one is dying of a heart attack). This can be done with chronic pain, as well (though, in such cases, we do not induce or exacerbate pain, but examine it when our immediate instinct is to withdraw from it). The effect in each context can be profound and induce deep insight. Like most people, Guillaume seemed more accustomed to simply reacting to his discomfort as opposed to examining it. Likewise, such experiences must have a deeper meaning when they lie outside of our immediate control.

Sometimes, though, we just hurt and do a very good job – as Guillaume has, perhaps without realizing it – at pinpointing why.

Guillaume describes the pastor that he spoke to “for hours” as someone “clearly not emotionally driven by some weird sense of having to compensate for something.” This might describe any number of pastors. If Guillaume is suggesting that he found just the right, intellectually unique pastor to guide him in his exploration – indeed, at this point, I’d say his confirmation – he would be mistaken. I’d venture to say that most pastors are intelligent, well-spoken, emotionally stable individuals. This extremely rational – to say nothing of conventional – appraisal of credibility is quite common and, unfortunately, cognitively under-informed. We are always – our preferences to the contrary notwithstanding – emotionally/affectively driven. The trick is incorporating discretion into that driven-ness, not eliminating emotional considerations, as analytic philosophy/Christian apologetics does so effectively.

While there simply may be parts of this story that Guillaume hadn’t had the time to share, there is nothing clear about how the head pastor that he referred to was motivated. While he may have adjusted his demeanor and language to Guillaume’s quite rational surface (perhaps not aware of the anxiety that Guillaume had only moments before been experiencing – was maybe still experiencing), the pastor’s very entry into his vocation may have been emotionally driven, born of an emotional insight into his own guilt, his own relationships, his own sense of meaninglessness or lack of connection with something larger… None of us can know for sure.

In any case, it would appear that Guillaume developed a relationship with this pastor – a friendship, perhaps, as he’d seen him for “a number of months” following this initial meeting in which Guillaume “bombarded” the pastor with questions.

I would venture a guess that – depending on his intellectual disposition – Guillaume might have gone to nearly anyone – a Buddhist monk, a Muslim intellectual, a well-spoken psychic – and given much the same kind of appraisal. Guillaume was ready to believe something. Not so coincidentally, I feel that he found something that was already rather familiar to him; familiar by virtue of his recent experience and his upbringing.

Guilt

It’s important to talk about something that I think may carry far more weight than any of Guillaume’s accounts conveyed; a crushing sense of guilt.

My first exposure to his guilt lay in the account of his conversion that Guillaume had written for himself (referenced below). Frankly, given the shadowy reference to this guilt, I’d imagined something far more dreadful than the still very vague explanation that I’d gotten from Guillaume later through a CBN commentary Justin had linked me to and a subsequent personal correspondence. Given his pursuit of pleasure, his suggestion of consciencelessness, culturally and personally driven womanizing and the cultural and political nature of modern Evangelical Christianity, I’d imagined that Guillaume had impregnated a woman and heartlessly compelled her to obtain an abortion.  As it was, there were varying levels to explanations of his guilt; either infidelity on his part or the encouragement of infidelity on the part of a sexual partner – something that I’d gotten from Guillaume personally that had grown deeply and tediously hurtful to everyone involved.

Let’s talk for a moment about conscience.

Guillaume, in response to Justin’s probing for a tipping point, makes note of having had some very high standards for “what sorts of reasons I would need to believe that God exists or that Jesus was raised from the dead.” His expectations were predicated on the expectation for “argumentation” or “evidence” and these expectations would go on to circumscribe Guillaume’s eventual justification for a belief that – I suspect – was already strongly rooted in his life. Guillaume’s standards may very well have been high, in the sense of demanding rigor, but they seem relatively un-nuanced – caught within the framework of how he believed he already “knew” how to obtain knowledge. Guillaume did, however, begin to reinvent his access to the particulars within this framework; namely, what he would accept as evidence for something that I’d assert he’d already begun to believe by the time he’d made this realization. Guillaume’s rather – to my mind – simplistic approach to “knowing” something includes the idea that we cannot “know” it if it isn’t true. So, indeed, we are often left with a choice: How do we retain meaning when there is already a very real sense of knowing that is at odds with this standard? For many, simply asserting to ourselves that we don’t actually know something isn’t enough. We make a choice to refine our evidential standards.

I’ve seen this done on a number of other occasions with other theologians. The circumstance that comes to mind most readily is in a discussion group I’d participated in a couple of years ago with Peter Williams and Dirk Jonkind of Tyndale House. (Interestingly, it is Dr. Jonkind’s views with regard to the “implausible” – as in “Everything in our lives is implausible,” that stick with me. If everything is implausible, the miraculous is quite easy to accept.) Dr. Williams, a noted authority in biblical textual criticism also made a revision to how he would view Biblical evidence. He would no longer harass the truth out of the Bible as he might a spouse whose behavior is suspect (or a questionable historical event), meaning he would no longer hold the Bible up to the same standards that he would other historical texts (for instance, seeking corroboration through a variety of historical sources). He would treat it “as a friend.”

Guillaume takes the Bible at its word because he had decided that someone reliable told him that what it postulates is true. To extend his metaphor of how he knows what his birthdate is, I’ll use my own birthdate and my own “reliable” source. Very simply, I have long outlived what I think is a source of that knowledge. In truth, my knowledge of my birthdate comes from a variety of sources and I cannot name them all at this time. However, such as they are, they are all I have. I have not decided that they are reliable. I don’t really know this. Indeed, my mother was mentally ill and possibly not so reliable as a source. Does this mean that I don’t know what my birthdate is? Of course not. However, I find myself in a “state of knowing” not because my birthdate really is July 11, 1962, but because I have no other recourse than to either believe the information that has matriculated in me over a long span of time and confirmed by a great many people who also believe that’s my birthdate, or simply come to the conclusion that the date itself is irrelevant except for certain practical reasons. (I tend toward the later.) I rather doubt that Guillaume’s birthdate was subject to the same revision of approach that his belief in God was; moving from asking for reasons to believe that it occurred at a particular time, as opposed to asking for reasons to doubt that it occurred at a particular time.

Where any such questions lack nuance lay in what appears to be Guillaume’s failure to ask himself not whether any of this was true, but whether or not he wanted or needed to believe it was true and why.

There is a principle in cognitive psychology known generally as the “mere-exposure effect.” Briefly – and insomuch as it is brief, a bit of an injustice to the concept – the mere-exposure effect describes our tendency to “prefer” or “like” something more as we are exposed to it. This is only one dimension of a complex web of factors in motivation and, hence, the injustice to the concept and how it fits here. Suffice it to say, spending months with a Christian pastor absorbed in what, for me, in any case, would have been the pleasurable intellectual pursuit of meaning yields – again – unsurprising results; a great liking of and preference for the underlying principles of Christianity. Guillaume’s inner narrative is, of course, inaccessible to us, so we’ll have to assume that he is summarizing his own experience of it accurately or meaningfully here. Even shortened and constrained to the limits of the show, his personal narrative leads me here.

Much of this kind of experience will come to us in the form of a personal revelation. Whether we call it an “ah-ha” moment, a “light bulb” experience, satori or anything else that suggests a sudden tipping point, it is likely that such a tipping point is merely the circumstantial tip of a very large iceberg, so to speak. It is nothing less than the culmination of our experience, our relationships and the acquisition of knowledge and feelings that go along with these over time. Put rather dramatically, Guillaume’s entire life led him here. This is quite special, but how all of our lives work. However, we are more likely to see the resulting realization as something that stands alone – a “key-in-lock” acquisition of knowledge, if you like. This realization is not unlike the special-ness of our desire to marry – immune from the statistical reality that it really isn’t so special; it is very common and fails frequently.

Guillaume describes his conscience as something that had been “seared.” If we are to take the culinary meaning of this word, we will assume something that has been heated suddenly and its exterior caramelized into a hardened, crisp surface that retains the flavor locked inside. Presumably – slipping ourselves more toward the reality of what a conscience is – this would also mean something that doesn’t take so well to a marinade; more or less impervious to influence from the outside. It is “locked,” or has become more significantly impermeable, in this sense. Unaffected.

To say that something has been “seared” is to suggest that something has happened to it to cause it to exist in that condition. Whether Guillaume was referring to a specific event or set of circumstances (like his culture) or our innate sinful nature is hard to determine based on what he had given. Whatever he meant, however, I don’t want to give it short shrift before saying this:

A conscience is not something that is simply “activated.” To imagine that a conscience existed dormant and waiting for the right circumstances to simply start working is to ignore developmental psychology altogether. Yes, there are those who simply don’t have them. We call them “psychopaths.” Guillaume presents as someone who is classically disposed to the hard sciences – concrete, black and white, linear. My wish is not to be unkind, but realistic. We frame the world and our experience in ways that we are both culturally and genetically disposed to. Somewhere between these two we direct ourselves in this disposition and its methods.

About guilt; I’m getting there. Guillaume said, suggesting that this was a response to a prayer for proof that he could accept and not make a fool of himself: “God reactivated my conscience that had been seared for years. It so happens that just about at the same time this investigation began I had myself engaged in very atrocious immoral sin against that person… it was pretty extreme, even by my own atheistic moral standards.”

Guillaume, in a sense, describes God causing his (moral) life to flash before his eyes.

“I was struck with guilt... intense physical guilt… physical pain out of the guilt of having done those things. And it’s from that place that all of a sudden [“out of the blue”] the things that I’d been reading and talking about  with this pastor made perfect sense. Now I understood the Gospel. Jesus died on the cross so that he could pay the price for my sins, and so I received that Gospel or the good news that I didn’t gain my salvation by my good works, but by simply placing my faith in Jesus… I received forgiveness that he purchased on the cross. So, that was a very strong ‘light bulb’ experience where I understood the Gospel… and from that place where God reactivated my conscience it turned on the light and I figured ‘I’m all in… I get it.’ And so, embraced the Gospel. I told God, ‘I’m giving you my life;’ I received the sacrifice of Jesus by faith alone and from there the guilt just evaporated…”

I’d never – as a Christian or non-Christian – taken the impression that personal guilt was something that a confession of faith was meant to free me of. Nonetheless, Guillaume’s account is quite familiar. It is, indeed, in any meaningful sense of the word a “religious” experience. That experience produced a result that – from either a secular or religious perspective – provided a resolution that Guillaume was unable to build a bridge to consciously… in a linear way. He needed to be forgiven and could not find a way to do it for himself. Now that forgiveness serves a double-duty. It frees Guillaume in much the way he’s described, though I’d describe this as a sort of religious “bliss” or “ecstasy” that, like being in love, will play itself out leaving Guillaume, if it hasn’t already, back in “the world,” so to speak. Personally, I’d question the integrity and reliability of someone who, through whatever process, could find themselves regularly freed of guilt if this wasn’t just a one-time occurrence. An interesting juxtaposition to Guillaume’s earlier, “de-activated” conscience.

This “light bulb” experience now also serves as affective “evidence” of the rightness of Guillaume’s knowledge (its correspondence with a factual reality). Again, another interesting juxtaposition to noting a pastor who was not in some sense “emotionally driven.”

The second part of this commentary will address Guillaume’s more explicitly philosophical justification for his claims to knowledge and belief.
_______________________

References

“How God turns a French atheist into a Christian theologian - My conversion story:” http://gracenyc.onthecity.org/plaza/topics/7becdc2df794f161230567bbbd6db1dd41ccf2cd

“Mission to Disprove God Reveals Need for Him:” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JM9_vxvN4Hg


“Unbelievable: The Flying Spaghetti Monster & New Atheism - Graham Veale & Rory Fenton:”http://www.premierchristianradio.com/Shows/Saturday/Unbelievable/Episodes/Unbelievable-The-Flying-Spaghetti-Monster-New-Atheism-Graham-Veale-Rory-Fenton [Note feedback in the last ten minutes for the previous week’s show.]

Thursday, September 19, 2013

On Sympathy

A few weeks ago I was sitting in the office of my pain management physician, an anesthesiologist, having my quarterly lidocaine injections done. This usually involves about twenty-five deep needle sticks into the muscles of my upper back and neck – at least a third going into my neck. Though I’m usually a little woozy and the left half of my tongue is numb when it’s all over, it’s by no means a terrible experience (particularly given that it’s as close to total relief from the pain of arthritis that I ever get). We’re compatible conversationalists. We always speak at length both before and during the injections.

As would probably be expected, we don’t socialize, but this doctor and I have come to share some fairly personal experiences and insights. This meeting was really no exception except that I’d had an experience just earlier that morning that struck me. It was an experience of profound sympathy.

What I revealed to the doctor – and it was cogent in the sense of recent reading he had been doing and my own professional insights into it – was that I don’t think of myself as a particularly “sympathetic” person. I seldom, as had been the case earlier that day, found myself preoccupied by feelings of sympathy toward others except those to whom I’m very closest – not even as a professional counselor. I don’t happen to find the apparent disparity troubling, partly because this is an aspect of myself that I accept quite easily – as is the case with most aspects of myself. The doctor may have thought that this made sense from a different perspective; I’d assumed that such a perspective had something to do with professional objectivity. Compassion is a core value for me – meaning that it is something that I see working at and toward as worthwhile. Being overwhelmed, or nearly overwhelmed, by sympathy is not an experience that I normally find valuable – or desirable. I think that my doctor identified and saw that a tendency away from being overwhelmed as a characteristic that led to a more perfect exercise of professional objectivity.

I’ll take a moment to give a short description of my doctor. He is a very compassionate man. This is at least partly reflected in the time that he takes, not just with me, but with all of his patients. He values all of us, sees and communicates with us in individual, non-paternalistic terms and expresses what looks like genuine pleasure each time we meet. It is a quiet, deliberate, warm pleasure with something of the sterile Buddhist about it on the surface (though I know that he is most definitely not a Buddhist and, indeed, he holds the popular Christian apologist, Ravi Zacharias in high esteem.). I say “on the surface,” because this is how Buddhist compassion or compassion exercised more generally as a core value can look from a distance. I might as well refer to the compassion exercised by a trauma nurse. He or she might work hard in helping us – harder than almost anyone else, out of proportion to the rewards that they receive – but we might still lie there without knowing them or their thoughts or their deeper, more concealed feelings and find ourselves asking quietly inside, Don’t you care about me? (That this expectation that others must suffer for us in some way – at least if they are to convey a sense of caring – is a subject for its own blog post.)

I’m convinced, for the most part, that the answer to that question is almost certainly, yes, where my doctor is concerned. I’m going to surmise that this is a “yes” without guilt – without guilt for its appearance; without guilt for what might be seen as the misleading nature of the exercise of such compassion; without guilt for the limitations of his exercise of compassion and without guilt for the sake of the “self” through which such apparently impersonal compassion is exercised. This surmising is connected to the other striking aspect of the sympathy that I felt that day – the powerful guilt that accompanied it.

Sympathy and compassion – as concepts, as feelings, as motivators – are often conflated with one another. Psychologist, Paul Ekman and the Dalai Lama synthesize some good definitions and distinctions in “Emotional Awareness: Overcoming the Obstacles to Emotional Balance and Compassion.” Ekman’s research has additionally been significant in not merely identifying the biological correlates of emotion (facial expression, in particular), but conceptualizing the distinction between emotions, feelings and moods. (Neurologist Robert Burton also delineates some meaningful distinctions between these.)

In The Moral Sense, James Q. Wilson made note of Adam Smith’s use of the term “sympathy” which we would normally hear used as “empathy” or “compassion.” I won’t try to make any more distinctions with regard to what I’d felt that morning except to say that my “sympathy,” was distinct from “empathy,” because I never took the step to imagine what my friend must have been feeling or how that felt. I had a strong sense of his distress as well as my own undifferentiated guilt.

Emotionally powerful experiences are not unusual for me. Emotional experiences in which I don’t have a sense of immediate insight are. Note that I’m being careful to use the term, “sense of immediate insight” here. I wouldn’t claim that all such insights are accurate or always point to a single emotional cause. In fact many may not. The Tibetan Buddhist teacher, Chogyam Trungpa, may have referred to this as an experience of “neurosis,” in the sense that “neurosis” was not necessarily a reflection of mental or emotional pathology, but something arising from “delusion” or a deluded state, in the, again, Buddhist sense of the word – a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the reality of the world. Nearly all such misunderstanding will necessarily derive from misconceptions of the “self,” what it is and whether or not such a thing even exists in the discrete sense.

Of particular note in this – and how guilt would come to be attached to sympathy – would be how Trungpa came to view “original sin” as integral to Western thinking and feeling. From a religious perspective – and perhaps the only meaningful perspective in the West, at base – original sin began with a single act… a single defilement or act of disobedience whose repercussions would be passed down not merely spiritually, but physically (Thomas Aquinas, theologian of the Catholic Church, believed that original sin was passed down via the semen – hence the “sinlessness” of Jesus via the virgin birth.). It is a remarkable example of a hierarchal oversimplification of human imperfection. This state is also often called “total depravity” – particularly by Reformed Christians or Calvinists. Theologically, the state of original sin implies not merely an intrinsic unwholesomeness, wickedness, evil or – as Leibniz held, a privation of good, but an inability or helplessness with regard to the rectification of this condition. (It is all but impossible to imagine that the similarity to Wilson’s and Smith’s original 12-Step recovery programs and the helplessness emphasized in every kind of addiction, as indicated in the first two steps, is merely coincidental.) The concept is so important that some conservative Calvinists have found it necessary to integrate the concept into the nature v. nurture debate. An acquaintance of my own, the wife of a local Reformed pastor, held forth once that she had proof of the intrinsic depravity or original sinfulness of mankind. Utilizing the otherwise intellectually post-modern concept of the blank slate, she told me in no uncertain terms that the proof lay in the “selfishness of infants.”

In more strict theological interpretations this actually means that not only is there nothing that can be done by anyone but God, but that the logic of God’s will is followed back to the idea that he, therefore, intended the individual depraved states and has made or allowed to be that such individuals irredeemable from the outset (“Outset,” in this case, meaning “before the beginning of the world.”) However, the idea of an event that has made us permanently and intrinsically “bad” without outside, supernatural intervention holds. (This explanation of original sin, depravity and predestination is extremely simplified. It is not my intention to give them unfair treatment. So, while I know that some of my Reformed friends will be anxious to offer technical corrections and a more nuanced explanation, understand that this simplification is not for clarifying a theological point, but how the idea of original sin relates to feelings of guilt.)

Put more succinctly, there is always something to feel guilty about and often there is simply nothing.  This generalized feeling of guild is sometimes referred to as “free-floating guilt,” which is not merely a guilty feeling but a disposition to guilt. (For more narrow instances of free-floating guilt in which there is generalized guilt over the course of hours or days, Paul Ekman might call this a kind of “mood,” distinct from “emotion,” not necessarily natural, and potentially destructive.) A long-term disposition to guilt – a long “guilty mood,” if you like, might even be described – as we might a disposition toward anger – as a “trait.” (See, trait theory) Free-floating guilt is sometimes confused with Martin Buber’s conception of “existential guilt,” a non-neurotic form of guilt resulting from actual harm done to others.

Again, from Trungpa’s Buddhist perspective, we might counterbalance this neurotic, free-floating guilt with a realization of “basic goodness… [goodness] without reference to bad” – a non-dualistic perspective on human nature:

“Trungpa Rinpoche felt that Western practitioners of meditation, as well as Western therapists and therapies, were often affected by a subtle, or not so subtle, hangover from the belief in “original sin.” He talked about this as a preoccupation with guilt and a feeling of being condemned, feeling that we did or are doing something bad or that something bad has been done to us, which is the source of our problems. In contrast to that guilty feeling, which he felt was quite foreign to Buddhism, he spoke of “basic goodness” as the foundation of experience and of meditation practice. Basic goodness is good without reference to bad, goodness as the ground of experience before the dualism of good and bad ever occurred. From this point of view, some sin or crime is not the fundamental root of our problems, although it may be a contributory factor. We don’t have to fear that, if we open up, we will discover some terrible inadequacy or secret about ourselves. When we clear away the clouds of confusion, we find that there has simply been a misunderstanding, which turns out to be our mistaken belief in a solid self or ego. We discover that our nature is like the sun shining in the sky: brilliant and fundamentally unobstructed… “ (As conveyed by Carolyn Rose Gimian in Trungpa’s, The Sanity We Are Born With, p. 329)

As do many naïve psychological realists, Christian teachers like Greg Koulk hold that if we feel guilty it’s because we are guilty – in the theological sense – though his apologetic tactic is to manipulate his partner in conversation into saying it rather than say it himself. He doesn’t, unfortunately, tease apart what this feeling of guilt points to in his own worldview and how it can be derived culturally.  The confounds for this claim remain intact and largely ignored.

In terms of original sin, I often – usually – find that we proceed from basic misunderstandings; specific, cultural or existential. I’ll throw into this misunderstanding as that which proceeds from making premature or unnecessary judgments. The nature of such misunderstandings is usually broad, as opposed to complex. Though the idea of original sin or depravity have been convoluted via Judeo-Christian theology, the basic idea is fairly simple; inheritance and “essentialism.” Inheritance in the sense of Aquinas, as referred to above, and essentialism, not merely as material attributes, but spiritual characteristics (as in, “… created in the image of God,” defining a basic human characteristic). Our common self-description as “created in the image of God,” can be seen as integral to a fundamental mistake of ego – of the dualistic nature that we are broken into pieces psychologically nearly from the outset. I think that this is the mortar in the foundation of “the first mistake” of ego – the mistake of pride. This pride can probably be seen as analogous to what I’m coming to feel is the “sympathy/guilt mistake.”

It’s time to circle back away from theological and philosophical convolutions. I had wondered at three things: 1) my sudden experience of an unexplained sympathy for a new friend; 2) the common attachment of guilt to that sympathy and 3) what I’ve come to see as my comfortable lack of sympathy.

I think that the answer to the first point is quite straightforward. Sympathy occurs not merely in my intentional conscious mind, but in what any number of computer and neuro-scientists – as well as psychodynamic psychologists – might call the “hidden layer,” or as the result of hidden layer processing; in other words, my subconscious. My body and mind responded in a way that I neither predicted nor could trace directly backward to my circumstances. I think that, perhaps, somewhere in this hidden layer, I’d passed an emotional tipping point that tripped faster than my conscious insight. Part of the exercise of insight in this would have been the realization of the inappropriateness of the guilt that I felt (which certainly came just a little later) as opposed to the initial surprise and confusion that dominated. An analogous professional explanation might be described in terms of my work with sociopaths. I’ve worked within a variety of professional psychiatric and psychological professional circles. If not in terms of time, in terms of intensity, forensic psychiatry has probably figured among the most significant of these. To oversimplify, working with those who are unambiguously sociopathic can have no emotional impact only if one is sociopathic oneself, with no sense of embarrassment, self-consciousness or guilty social reciprocity. Appeals to sympathy are extremely common. Denying oneself a response to sympathy is a sometimes wrenching experience, often fraught with guilt. An experienced insight into my own feelings – whether within a professional or personal context – must give me momentary pause in the here and now to consider the possibility that what I’m describing as of just several weeks ago is a response to sociopathy or narcissism, characterlogically disordered states that are sometimes best viewed on a continuum with one another.  I prefer to lean toward trust, but cannot responsibly neglect justifying that trust – which I have to a point. For now, I’ll go with the working hypothesis that this experience of the pairing of sympathy and guilt are like many others with those I know to be possessed of normal conscience.

Again, feeling such guilt precipitates a kind of reasoning backward from the result, though, as this guilt – I believe – was of the “free-floating” sort, as discussed above, there was really nothing specifically and clearly personal to reason back to (Part of the justification of trust that I’d mentioned just above; no specific appeals to reciprocity or connection.). There was only cultural history to draw on and how that history had been affirmed and supported through, in particular, my early life. (I held a tension or, if you like, dissonance regarding my relationship with my mother between the ages of eleven and thirteen. On the one hand, “Why does she hate me?” – the “why” in this indicating that I’d done nothing that I could “reason back to” to deserve her hatred – and the feeling of rightness that such hatred should be directed at me. Much, if not most, of this was religiously driven and I would go on to my early to mid-twenties causing some very kind Episcopal theologians to suffer terribly for not being capable of providing a satisfactory answer to this offense for me. It is a true regret.).

Answering the second question – as does the question itself – might suggest that there is some utility in guilt or remind them that guilt suggests a kind of nobility. We have to suffer in order to drive that which is best in us. We often seem to believe that we must sacrifice and we must feel pain because being good hurts. We lose more in virtue than we immediately gain, which is why the attainment of virtue and virtuous states is difficult and one of the reasons that delaying gratification is seen – often rightly to make matters more complex – as an indication of good judgment and character. Suffering is part of a process of justification, not just in a personal, but theological, and hence ultimate, sense. It may lie at the heart of the sense in Christianity that if you are not suffering persecution, for instance, you are doing something wrong as a Christian. I have come to see this theistic tenet as somewhat perverse.

The backlash to all of this, of course, lay in the overused, “I have no regrets.” Or, if there are regrets (and hence, guilt) it is over something quirkily trivial as from Peggy Sue Got Married.

“Grandpa, do you have any regrets?” Grandpa responds distractedly and in a way that indicates that the question is so irrelevant to his now wise and profound existence with, “Well, I wish I’d taken better care of my teeth.”

Lacking the profundity of Peggy Sue’s grandfather, my response to this backlash is with the certainty that we will attach to regret and guilt in the same ways that we will attach to anything that welds together the edifice of a self – particularly if it is a virtuous self. It is fairly popular not merely to embrace disproportionately, but to exclude things like regret and guilt from our emotional repertoires.  As exclusions, I usually hear such points made as, “____ is useless;” or “there is no such thing as ____.” If a rebuttal to the latter is pressed, an appeal will often be made to the former in the sense of, “What I meant was…,” and the discounting of the state continues. Backlashes of any kind lack subtlety. A backlash against regret and guilt is no exception.

This doesn’t tell us that people – either individually or collectively – are stupid. It merely tells us that most of such reasoning is done publicly and under the pressure of challenges as simple as, “What do you mean by…?”  So, discussion is important, not necessarily for the pedantic opportunities that it provides unstoppably excited talkers like me, but because we put this stuff together in community. That community can be defensive and insular; it can be oriented toward a desire for justice; it can be a bull-horn for a few charismatic or aggressive individuals. But even with this combination of hazard and justifiability, it is worthwhile. We can utilize still another psycho-cognitive analogy in the form of transactive memory. While originally meant to flesh out a social psychological/cognitive issue like group-think, transactive memory has taken on a broader definition in the cognitive and neurological sciences as simply memory stored outside of the human central nervous system. A broader, transactive cognition might be seen as the formation of not merely memory, but of thought and the formation of belief in a public or community context. (While only one of these books refers to transactive memory explicitly, both access the concept: On Intelligence by Jeff Hawkins and Sandra Blakeslee and Accidental Mind, The: How Brain Evolution Has Given Us Love, Memory, Dreams, and God by David J. Linden.)

This is something more than simply a declaration of the importance of community, but a deeper, more integrated functionality – as might be indicated in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s Each and All… “Nothing is fair or good alone.” Extended, this might be taken to read that there is little of meaning – and perhaps nothing real worth considering – in isolation.

My guilt, while not meaningless, is much like my pride or anyone else’s. On reflection, I care little for it, and I care little for yours except to the extent that it indicates that we suffer, we have suffering – and its basic causes –  in common. This could be described, appropriately, I think, in Buddhist terms. However, as Trungpa indicated to Daniel Goleman (of “Emotional Intelligence” fame), “Buddhism will come to the West as psychology” [emphasis mine], I won’t give the egoistic valuation of guilt a strictly “psychological” name, but give it a psychological (and perhaps more descriptive) referent – “desperation.” My use of the term comes not from the appeal of the word itself (I can think of any number of words in the past that I’ve wanted to use because they would sound cool as part of a unifying psychological/philosophical edifice.), but from my memory of my feelings in thousands of sessions with my therapy clients and still more countless “sessions” of confidences with friends and acquaintances. There is a tone to the building and driving of “ego” or “self,” for lack of better terms. That tone is “desperation,” and I’ve come to realize a certain narrow range of triggering events in the realization, whether a close friend or someone I’ve spoken to briefly with waiting on line at Starbucks. The realization of desperation is not unlike the realization of psychopathy in my early years of mental health practice.

As a psychiatric RN had advised, “Look at your own feelings. If you find yourself reacting to someone as ‘creepy,’ or you find the hairs on the back of your neck standing up, consider psychopathy as a diagnosis or, at the very least, a strong possibility even if not diagnosable strictly by the standard criteria.” I found this to be an incredibly helpful recommendation on a dangerous, maximum security forensic psychiatric ward.

It would be easy to reason backward from the realization of such a feeling or feelings; That feeling was immediately preceded by a certain kind of gesture or facial expression or tone of voice. Though this reasoning may be accidentally valid at times, it often reflects something illusory; a perception driven by bias – for the same reason that there is no such thing as a “shooter face” in a crowd at a political rally, only out of place postures, gestures, and facial expressions for a given context.

As with all such things, the triggering event in me is emotional. One day we’ll talk about how even the most rational of realizations possess this indispensable component if they are to be, in fact, realized as knowledge even in the most rigorous epistemic sense. That rational realizations are emotionally isolated or bereft of an emotional component is another of those deep – and often tragic – misunderstandings of human existence.

Guilt is one of the most profound indicators of not merely desperation, but of despair itself. It’s that, “I’m running – or have run out of – time” feeling; “Maybe I can’t go back and fix this… maybe there is nothing that I’ve broken that can be fixed.” There are no realizable options. This is the quintessential core of despair itself, particularly as represented in what we’ve come to understand as depression. I believe that, in these cases, there is often not enough maturity or remaining emotional wherewithal to make this a realization about something existential like mortality. There is not enough energy to drive that kind of breadth of consideration in real depression. There is, instead, a kind of childish narrowing or closing in – as in the representation of Hell in the Robin Williams film, What Dreams May Come.  

I’m using the term, guilt, while at times not precisely, often synonymously with regret, not in its theological sense. In other words, I’m using the term as representative of an emotional state, not as a condition of metaphysical gracelessness. Regret, obviously, could not be used in this sense, as in, “He felt the regret of the sin that he inherited from Adam.”

With regard to the question of why I don’t sense a great sympathetic core within myself, there is this: I do feel warmth toward others… a genuine interest and affection for others. Given this, I’m not sure that I find it necessary to find a place for sympathy. It has, perhaps, found its own place without being named or categorized. It’s true; I seldom feel a great swelling of sadness for others. However, I do often feel a great swelling of emotion over our connections. This presents me with a dilemma – though not a dilemma, I think, that we don’t all contend with in one way or another. The difference in the character and presentation of the dilemma is in what we need to do in order to remain attentive to the important issues around it. People like Adam Smith have written for many, many years that our most pressing concerns are those that are most immediate and – in the language of cognitive and social psychology, “available” (as in availability bias). What follows is taken from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759):

“Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all, express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections upon the precariousness of human life, and the vanity of all the labours of man, which could thus be annihilated in a moment. He would too, perhaps, if he was a man of speculation, enter into many reasonings concerning the effects which this disaster might produce upon the commerce of Europe, and the trade and business of the world in general. And when all this fine philosophy was over, when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquillity, as if no such accident had happened. The most frivolous disaster which could befal himself would occasion a more real disturbance. If he was to lose his little finger to-morrow, he would not sleep to-night; but, provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound security over the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren, and the destruction of that immense multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to him, than this paltry misfortune of his own. To prevent, therefore, this paltry misfortune to himself, would a man of humanity be willing to sacrifice the lives of a hundred millions of his brethren, provided he had never seen them?”

One of the things that this suggests – along with what it means for a “connexion” to be available, is that, for those things that we find worth valuing – whatever the reasons –  such as the sympathy noted above Smith’s speculation, we create a structure for maintaining such attention to sympathy or we borrow one from a tradition or institution. Buddhism and Christianity, for instance, both have extensive – though highly divergent – traditions for maintaining that attention which is a deliberate making available of. Each, in its own way, can be compared to the priority and emphasis that we give to certain memories. We do this by rehearsal and association – each of them both deliberate and reflexive activities that indicate the priority we give to one thing or another. Given what we often think of as our “fallen” nature, we find it difficult to relax mindfully into an appropriate sympathetic mode without such structure and rehearsal. The petitionary prayers of Christians and the meditations, vows and prayers of Buddhists exemplify such structure. The various Buddhist traditions that orient one toward sympathy, compassion or lovingkindness (Mettā in Pali or maitrī in Sanskrit), more specifically orient practitioners to a natural experience of such feeling. Beyond early to middle Christian contemplative practice – as in the Christian mysticism of the Middle-Ages – awareness and orientation toward such feeling takes a more legalistic approach in prescriptive terms and genuine feeling and expression tend to occur in a less structured, individual way.

The predictable outward manifestation of a Christian movement toward sympathy – as an institution –  is a strong perception that it is work against our individual and collective metaphysical fallen natures as opposed to toward a naturally occurring manifestation of basic, non-dualistic goodness and Buddha-nature (Buddha-dhātu in Sanskrit) that is supported by the contemplative practices noted above. One frees, expands and focuses attention; the other ties it up. In this sense, the diminishment and marginalization of the Christian contemplative traditions could properly be seen as tragic.

As I think of this thesis I am reminded of modern mystical theistic traditions like Jewish Hasidism with its strongly contemplative and legalistic, or orthodox, aspects. Such a tradition should challenge the idea that a tradition cannot be both contemplative and legalistic and that each is mutually exclusive. If it seems that I’ve suggested that such exclusion is the case above, the dichotomy was for the purpose of illustration.

So, is there anything prescriptive that can be drawn from all of this? Is there a practical point? It depends on whether or not you find value in the idea of concepts like sympathy, empathy or compassion and what they imply about and between us. Without a practice – such as meditation or contemplative prayer – that connects us to an honest view of what we are – internally and in relation – we will have nothing but external referents; those things that drive philosophies like objectivism, the driving force behind the legalism of the great monotheistic moral systems. This touches on much of what I’ve come to think of as “heartless” in those traditions.

So, even if the conventional, guilt-associated conception of sympathy isn’t a priority for you… enjoy the warmth and the swell of feeling that comes with appreciating that warmth. A more appropriate and realistic sympathy may follow.

Friday, August 16, 2013

Intelligent Design: Just Terribly Misunderstood? Part 1

Introduction

For this blog post, I wanted to address both a specific Facebook thread originated by my friend Vocab Malone as well as associated points deriving from the interview that Vocab had linked to and commented on; core elements of the modern intelligent design movement and supporting and dissenting views from people like William Dembski, Michael Behe and Ken Miller. (The series of In Our Time episodes originally broadcast on BBC4 Radio, can be found here.) I felt that it was better to start getting this series out sooner than later. Consequently, though I’ve linked to and been specific with regard to many sources, a more formally structured references section will have to wait for the end of the series. I appreciate your patience and hope that the “in-text” references that I have provided will prove helpful to you.

Note: Where I don’t give specific references to comments by William Dembski or Ken Miller it can be assumed that the editorials that such comments come from will be covered and linked to more thoroughly in the next part. Those specific editorials are, STILL SPINNING JUST FINE: ARESPONSE TO KEN MILLER, linked to by Vocab in response to my posting of The Flagellum Unspun: The Collapse of ‘Irreducible Complexity’

The initial discussion – chasing a moving target

The depth of my response and my decision to address it in a blog post, as opposed to within the thread itself, comes about from the rabbit hole that was uncovered within just a few questions of the original comment: “the Cambrian Explosion demonstrating the nature of the problem that atheists face”. I wished, and still wish, to keep my original questions nearer the surface than buried under deeper points and moving rhetorical goalposts. To be clear, the most basic issues boil down to one fundamental question: Are theists falling back – directly or indirectly – to an argument from ignorance or personal incredulity? Are they just terribly misunderstood, as both Dembski and Vocab suggest? Individual components of this question (as taken from the Facebook discussion) included, but were not limited to the bulleted points:

  • “What are you noting as the problem, Vocab; the variety, the strangeness, the ‘special preservation?’” (The specifics were derived from comments made with regard to the Burgess Shale finds and the Cambrian Explosion by the researchers being interviewed in the BBC program that Vocab had linked to.)

Though Vocab’s response to this can be viewed within the thread itself by many, the summation was essentially, “I appreciate their expertise, collegiality and candor. I'm just saying that evolution leaves lots of unanswered questions - in fact, I would say too many to be viable.” This response included another link to an abstract for a paper by one of the subjects of the interview, Simon Conway Morris, originally linked to on BBC4: Walcott, the Burgess Shale andrumours of a post-Darwinian world.

It’s probably better to note earlier than later that “evolution” can mean one of several different things in the context of this controversy. First, and most basically, it can refer to “change over time.” It can describe a process or processes by which organisms transition from the simpler to the more complex. It can also refer to ultimate origins and it is not unusual, in this sense, to find biological evolution placed on a continuum with cosmological evolution by scriptural literalistic theists. Another meaning is more specifically biological and is usually equated to Darwin’s model (often slavishly so when it suits the rhetorical needs of ID proponents or creationists) of natural selection (including sexual selection and, more recently, group selection). The more modern, specifically biological, definition also includes mutation, migration and genetic drift. The popular, non-theistic explanation for these mechanisms is that they are largely random, though that tends to represent a statistical oversimplification. It is this randomness that excludes deliberate design via an intelligent agent that ID proponents tend to take most strenuous issue with. Lastly, “evolution” can refer to ultimate biological origins. This is probably the most persistent source of the perception of arguments from ignorance, as in, “Sure, you can explain the ‘micro-evolution’ that circumscribes the study of immunology, but you can’t explain how cells, cellular machines, organs, etc. came to exist or were organized.”

Though I know Vocab personally and happen to know that he is an “old-earth” biblical literalist, it should not be taken for granted that he has made a sweeping proclamation with regard to “evolution” generally and what it can or cannot answer or predict (though prediction seems seldom to be on the mind of the scriptural literalist). For instance, Vocab is intelligent and well-educated and I have no doubt that he accepts the hair-splitting particularity of micro-evolution and its effects on “kinds” as opposed to the “speciation” of macro-evolution.

From within the context of that original interview, I was still somewhat confused as to the specifics of Vocab’s point – particularly now that he’d introduced not an article, but an abstract that utilized the term, “Darwin fatigue.” So, I continued to question and comment, suggesting, particularly as he had raised the point of irreducible complexity, that he might put a little time into studying the field of complex systems itself.

  • One of the more pressing questions that I’d asked (at least to my mind, and particularly as I’d repeated it at least once) was, “And I really would love to have your response on this point, Vocab: ‘I'm just saying that evolution leaves lots of unanswered questions - in fact, I would say too many to be viable.’ How many “answered” questions would you need to make it viable [, Vocab]?”

As it turned out, this is not what Vocab was “just saying.” (And no, he did not answer the “how many questions” question.) He had more in mind still that was not even hinted at in the original post – which did indeed suggest a kind of “argument from ignorance or personal incredulity” by way of continually asserting that there were unanswered questions and things that atheists would “need to explain.” It would be a mistake to naively assume that this is all that was meant in Vocab’s original comment. The most probable implication would be that there are unanswerable questions – at least when taken from within an evolutionary or “Darwinian” framework. If the framework that these questions could be answered from isn’t theistic, I have yet to hear what it is.

At this point, though Vocab had responded to my questions – or perhaps simply to the fact that I wrote something that he assumed he’d disagree with – he hadn’t actually answered any.

  • I had – again –  given Vocab choices from which to respond from, i.e., “This was my first, most basic point regarding the "nature of the problem that atheists face:" "What are you noting as the problem, Vocab; the variety, the strangeness [of the fossilized creatures found within the Burgess Shale], the ‘special preservation?’ ... or are you simply, again, referring to the number of unanswered questions? Is that the "nature" of the problem?”

Vocab responded with, “Wade: here is a paragraph I just read from Dembski's book on intelligent design that you may find helpful as it expresses my viewpoint for the most part…” (Vocab cited neither the name of the book, nor a page number.). Finding which book that he was referring to and pinning the quotation down specifically was a tedious enterprise. Importantly, I wasn’t at a loss with regard to Vocab’s views; this wouldn’t be the first time that he and I have discussed the ID/evolution controversy. It was that I had asked specific questions, not to be “helped” with regard to understanding his worldview or its component parts.

(The book in question was titled, Intelligent Design: Bridging the Gap Between Science and Theology (p. 113). I’ll include some of the search process in the “References” section at the end of the series as the process in itself, as both in the form of dead ends and related results may be helpful to readers on each side of the debate. And, at the risk of sounding a little pissy – yes, it was a tedious enterprise. Thanks, Vocab.)

  • In fairness to Vocab, when I point out what appears to be the inadvertent expression of a cognitive bias in his responses to me I received, “I thought this was in line with the question you asked. My bad.” Vocab had – again – glossed over that I’d asked not many, but certainly more than one, question. This happens because Vocab disposes himself to being “chased down” by both answering questions that haven’t been asked, and throwing out new points before he has answered the questions that have already been asked. However, perhaps by virtue of an inability to surmount a persistent tendency toward viewing this issue in a biased fashion (Something that I’ll cover in another blog post specific to cognitive bias.), Vocab went on, while explicitly stating that people like the misunderstood Dembski really did have positive information and concepts to offer (not personal incredulity) he continued to allude to ignorance or personal incredulity with phrases like, “utterly intractable” (from a quotation attributed to Dembski), “That evolutionists realize they have problems when they're by themselves” (This said in light of the fact that the entire discussion that Vocab linked to was aired publicly on BBC4; more of an ad hominem specifying a lack of integrity and compartmentalization of the “problems” that atheists/Darwinists face – a cheap shot that I’ll have to remember the next time I’m admonished by him to be nicer or more “generous” with intellectually lazy, dishonest or hypocritical Christians), “too many [unanswered questions] to be viable;” “The question is does the theory even have the right narrative for life, the right mechanism(s), the right big idea in place. No, it seems certain it does not. That is why these problems won't go away” (Vocab has asked and answered his own questions here, which make the questions themselves meaningless in the context of this discussion – begging the question. He hasn’t troubled himself to even pretend to entertain alternatives to what “right narrative” might be here.), “And I was not impressed with Miller, especially the tie clip illustration. That almost seemed like bad comedy - almost.” (ad hominem; dismissive; again belying that this is not encouragement or prescription of real discussion.) Vocab was obviously finished before I asked my first question.), “… not only do they [“evolutionists”] need to find…” (more allusion to unanswered questions, with the implication being that an answer must be “filled in” or another model “wins” by default – basically, a functional definition of an argument from ignorance or personal incredulity.); and lastly “… don’t have a clue” (Dembski).

(As an aside for Vocab, the “tie clip” (a mousetrap with the holding bar removed, pinning Ken Miller’s tie in place) was a figurative “prop” first utilized by Michael Behe on page 42, and others, of Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challengeto Evolution.)

Again, all of this seems to begin and end with, “You can’t explain “x,” so…” It’s reminiscent of the Scientific Creationism of the 70’s and 80’s that I’d become quite familiar with as a conservative Christian myself. I see no “positive” evidence or a model that is not “preclusive” in nature (to anything but ID) – meaning that the lack of an answer to one or more questions precludes a broader explanation from the model from which the questions originate. The questions seem/are intractable; therefore, the model from which they originate must be bad. (Dembski, at least discusses the idea of intractability in The DesignInference: Eliminating Chance through Small Probabilities (p. 92). I have yet to see Vocab discuss intractability and the idea that some of these questions – again, from an evolutionary perspective – might be unanswerable. So far, I think “wrong narrative” is as good as it gets.

For an interesting rebuttal to The Design Inference and many of the ideas that Dembski lays out alongside of Behe’s irreducible complexity (i.e., “specified complexity”) see The advantages of theft over toil: the design inference andarguing from ignorance (Williams, et al, 2001).